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Finding a Cause of Action for
Wrongful Death in the
Warsaw Convention:
Benjamins v. British European Airways
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided in
Benjamins v. British European Airways' that article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention2 is self-executing. That is, the treaty alone, without additional
legislative action, now creates a cause of action for wrongful death.
The facts of the case are simple; on June 18, 1972, an airplane designed
and manufactured by Hawker-Siddely Aviation, Ltd. and owned and
operated by British European Airways departed for Brussels from
London's Heathrow Airport. Soon thereafter, the plane crashed into a
field, killing all 112 passengers.
Abraham Benjamins, the spouse of one of the passengers, brought
suit for wrongful death and baggage loss in the Eastern District of New
York as representative of his wife's estate. Plaintiff was a Dutch citizen
permanently residing in California. Defendants were British corporations
with their principal places of business in the United Kingdom. The ticket
on which the decedent was traveling had been purchased in Los Angeles.
The original complaint alleged only diversity of citizenship as grounds
for federal jurisdiction;3 because Benjamins, a resident alien, could not be
diverse from an alien corporation,4 the complaint was dismissed.
Benjamins' suit reached the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit after
the district court, in an unreported decision, dismissed an amended
complaint asserting federal question jurisdiction.5 The Second Circuit
1. 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978).
2. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to InternationalTransportation by
Air, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (concluded October 12, 1929; adhered to by United States June 27,
1934) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention].
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976) provides that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of S10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are
additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a
State or of different States.
4. "A foreign-born resident, who has not been naturalized according to the acts of congress, is
not a'citizen' of the United States or of a state, within the definition given by the fourteenth amendment
to the constitution, but remains a foreign subject or citizen." City of Minneapolis v. Reum, 56 F. 576,
581 (8th Cir. 1893) (citing Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838)). Because neitherparty
was a "citizen," there was no diversity.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) provides in relevant part: "(a) The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of S10,000,
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expressed approval of the district court's determination that plaintiff could
not successfully invoke the Alien Tort Claims Act,6 but reversed on the
ground that because the Warsaw Convention created a cause of action for
wrongful death, plaintiff's cause of action arose under a treaty of the
United States. In support of its decision to reverse, the court concentrated
on the minutes and documents of the meetings that led to the adoption of
the Convention in 1929, the official French text of the treaty as well as the
unofficial English translation, and the interpretations adopted by other
signatory states. These considerations, the court asserted, proved that the
signatories intended to create a right to sue for wrongful death. The court
further concluded that "the desirability of uniformity in international air
law can best be recognized by holding that the Convention . . . is also the
universal source of a right of action," and that the ability of the federal
courts to consolidate suits for the purposes of pretrial proceedings7 "makes
federal jurisdiction peculiarly appropriate in large air crash cases."8
The Benjamins opinion is weak because it does not support its
position any better than the cases it overruled supported theirs9 and
incomplete because it neither fully applies the traditionally enunciated test
of whether the Convention is self-executing 0 nor explains the practical
considerations that entered into the decision." This Case Comment
explores each of these areas.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention was concluded on October 12, 1929. The
scope of the Convention is limited by the terms of its first article to
"international transportation," defined to include flights between: (1) two
or more signatory states; and (2) points within a single signatory state if
there is an agreed stopping place outside that state.12 Whether the contract
is for international transportation is determined by reference to the ticket
or, in the case of goods shipped, to the air waybill, which fixes the nature of
the transportation as domestic or international the moment it is issued. 13
exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States . .. ."
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976) provides that: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." The Warsaw Convention does not prohibit international aviation accidents, but rather
provides at least some of the rules for compensating the victims.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976) creates the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation to preside over
consolidated pretrial proceedings.
8. 572 F.2d 913, 919 (1978).
9. See notes 52-56 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 60-100 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 101-26 and accompanying text infra.
12. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(2).
13. Id.
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Thus, an air carrier whose planes never leave the United States is involved
in the international transportation of certain passengers when it carries
these passengers from Chicago to New York, where they will change planes
and continue their journey to London.
An important provision of the Convention placed a monetary
limitation on air carrier liability to passengers for personal injury. The
limit was set at 125,000 Poincar6 francs, or $8,300 per passenger.1 4 A
carrier could not avail itself of the limitation if the damage was caused by
its own willful misconduct 5 or if it had failed to deliver to the passenger a
ticket containing the information specified in article 3 of the Convention.16
The United States did not participate in any of the preparatory
meetings and sent only a observer to the Convention in 1929. It was not
until 1934 that President Roosevelt urged adherence to the Convention in
the belief that the benefits to be gained by its provisions outweighed the
detriment of the liability limitations. The Senate gave its advice and
consent on July 17, 1934.18 Ninety days after depositing its declaration of
adherence with the government of Poland on July 31, 1934, the United
States was bound by the terms of the Warsaw Convention as by any
treaty. 19
The United States has ratified none of the protocols to the Convention
that would have raised the $8,300 limitation on air carrier liability for
personal injury.20 Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the limitation has been
severely undermined during the last forty years. Passengers were granted
some relief from the $8,300 limitation by court decisions to the effect that
the limitations did not apply when the ticket was not delivered far enough
in advance of the flight's departure to allow the passenger a reasonable
opportunity to protect himself against them,2' when the ticket was not
legible enough to 'give adequate notification that the Conventional
limitations applied,22 or when the willful misconduct of the airline's
14. Id. art. 22. One franc is defined as 65.5 milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine
hundred thousandths. Id. The purposes of tying the limitation to gold were to ensure uniformityand to
protect the real value of the limitation from the "vagaries of currency fluctuation." The possibility that
gold might someday be demonitized was not considered. K. RosENN, LAW AND INFLATION ,ch.7 (to be
published in May 1979).
15. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 25.
16. Id. art- 3.
17. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the WVarsawv Conwntion, 80 HARv. L
REv. 497, 502 (1967).
18. 78 CONG. REc. 11582 (1934).
19. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 17, at 502.
20. The Protocol adopted at the Hague in 1955 raised the limit to approximately S16,600; the
Protocol adopted at Guatemala City in 1971 raised the limit to 100,000 SDRs (defined at note 130
infra) and provided for supplemental plans by individual nations to ensure passengers' lives for an
additional $200,000. See notes 128-37 and accompanying text infra.
21. Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 856 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816
(1965).
22. Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.A., 370 F.2d 508, 514 (2d Cir. 1966), aJJ'dmen,, 390
U.S. 455 (1968).
1979]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL. [Vol. 40:277
employees caused the accident. 23 Furthermore, in response to intense
pressure from the American government, the affected air carriers agreed
in 1966 to absolute liability in damages up to $75,000 for injury to their
passengers traveling to, from, or with an agreed stopping place in the
United States.24 As the liability limitations lost their effectiveness through
judicial interpretation, the following benefits to passengers, which
proponents of adherence to the treaty had argued would offset the low
liability limits, either never materialized or declined in importance.
1. Presumption of Liability
Article 17 of the Convention 25 shifted the burden of proof on the issue
of negligence to the air carrier by creating a rebuttable presumption in
favor of the passenger;2 6 as the accident record of the airline industry
improved, however, res ipsa liquitur27 became readily available to
plaintiffs suing air carriers. 28 The differences between res ipsa and the
Conventional presumption of air carrier liability relate to what the plaintiff
must show in order to escape a directed verdict and will rarely affect the
result of a case.29
2. Protection From Other, Lower Liability Limits
Proponents of adherence had argued that the Convention would
protect American travelers from the unreasonably low limits on liability
that might be in effect at the place of accident.30 Such protection was fairly
important in 1934, because the rule in all American jurisdictions at the time
23. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 219 F. Supp. 289,318 (S.DN.Y. 1963),
rev'd on other grounds, 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
24. The United States applied pressure by denouncing the Convention-that is, by withdrawing
from the Convention in accordance with the formal mechanism provided for that purpose by article
39-with the denunciation to take effect six months hence. The denunciation was withdrawn by the
Government only after the members of the International Air Transport Association agreed to waive
the limitations up to $75,000. For a detailed history of these events, sce Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 17, at 546-96.
25. Article 17 provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a
passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the
damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course ofany of the operations
of embarking or disembarking.
49 Stat. 3000, 3018 (1929).
26. Letter from Secretary of State Hull to President Roosevelt, SaNATE COMM. ON FORaVzON
RELATIONS, S. EXEC. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934), reprinted in [1934] U.S. Av. Rt'. 240
[hereinafter cited as Hull-Roosevelt letter].
27. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur there arises at least a permissible inference of
defendant's negligence if plaintiff's injury is occasioned by "(1) [an] event . . . of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) . . . caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive control of defendant; (3) . . . [and not] due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OFTIE LAW ot TorTs § 39,
at 214 (4th ed. 1971).
28. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 17, at 521.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 527.
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was lex loci delicti; that is, the cause of action was created and the damages
determined by the law of the place where the fatal accident occurred.31
The effect of lex loci has been severely undercut by a number of cases,
beginning with Kilberg v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.32 That case arose out of
the crash of an airliner in Massachusetts. Had the court applied the
doctrine of lex loci, plaintiff's recovery would have been limited to S15,000
by Massachusetts statute;33 the court held, however, that although the
cause of action on which plaintiff was suing was created by the laws of
Massachusetts, the measure of damages would be determined by the
laws of New York, which was the forum state and plaintiff's place of
residence.34 The Kilberg rule has been adopted by the authors of the
Restatement:
In an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where the injury
occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with
respect to the particular issue [e.g., damages], some other state has a more
significant relationship . . . to the occurrence and the parties, in which
event the local law of the other state will be applied.5
Some state courts have adopted a similar rule that turns on "governmental
interest" rather than "substantial relationship." 36 Both of these terms lave
remained only vaguely defined, and seem calculated to give the courts
maximum discretion in resolving conflict of laws issues .37 It is unlikely that
an American court would find that a foreign country with outrageously
low liability limitation has either a more substantial relationship to, or a
greater governmental interest in an American plaintiff and the measure of
damages he receives in a wrongful death action.
3. Jurisdiction
Article 28 of the Convention supposedly eliminated the American
wrongful death plaintiff's problem of establishing venue in an American
court,38 at least in the typical case in which the passenger bought a round-
31. J. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 412.1-.2 (1935).
32. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
33. Id. at 39, 172 N.E.2d at 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135; MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 229, § 2
(1958).
34. 9 N.Y.2d at 42, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137-38.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 175 (1971) (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal 3d 574,522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974).
37. For an excellent discussion of the law of conflicts, see Powers, Formalism and
Nonformalism in Choice of Law Methodology, 52 WAsH. L. Rv. 27 (1976). In analyzing a number of
New York cases, Professor Powers states: "To the extent that the identification of policies behind
various rules become indeterminable and subject to manipulation, the method itself becomes
inconclusive and subject to manipulation." Id. at 41.
38. Under art 28, suit may be brought in any of four countries: (1) the domicile of the carrier,
(2) the carrer's principal place of business; (3) the place of business at which the ticket was purcha-ed
(held in Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 360 F.2d 804, 813 (2d Cir. 1966), to include the location of the
ticket office of another airline selling the defendant's tickets, even though the defendant had no offices
in the country); or (4) the place of destination.
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trip ticket at his own domicile.3 9 This provision has not proved particularly
helpful to plaintiffs. Even when the United States satisfies the requirements
of article 28, no American court is compelled by the Convention to exercise
jurisdiction.40 Thus, the plaintiff is forced to establish that the court of his
choice has personal jurisdiction, and must still find and serve the
defendant, even if the defendant is "doing business" within the
forum.4' If the Convention gives a court subject matter jurisdiction, it
is because some article other than article 28 creates a cause of action.
4. Inducement to Settle Out of Court
The $8,300 limitation on personal injury liability was expected to
induce parties to settle their differences out of court.42 Apparently, it was
expected that plaintiffs would realize they were bound by the limitations,
that air carriers would realize that $8,300 was as little as they were likely to
be assessed in damages, and that both would want to avoid the expense of
litigation. This benefit disappeared, if it ever existed, as courts began to
recognize exceptions to the liability limitations43 and plaintiffs discovered
that the limitations did not apply to airplane manufacturers.4
5. A Conventional Cause of Action
Another anticipated benefit was the creation of a federal cause of
action for the wrongful death of a passenger engaged in international
transportation. 45 Although the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had
earlier held that articles 1846 and 30(3)47 combine to create a federal cause
of action for baggage loss,48 the Benjamins holding that the Convention
also creates a right to sue for wrongful death finds little support in the
decisions of other courts.
39. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 17, at 522-23. In the atypical case in which an
American has bought a ticket in France for a Paris-New York-Paris trip, the passenger or his personal
representative may not bring suit in an American court because the Convention considers Paris to be
both the place of departure and the destination.
40. Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir. 1971).
41. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 17, at 522-26.
42. Hull-Roosevelt letter, supra note 26.
43. See notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra.
44. Aviation Protocols: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1977) (statement of John Martin) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
45. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 17, at 517. The source of this new cause of action was
to be art. 17 (text quoted at note 25 supra).
46. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 18, provides in part: "(1) The carrier shall be liable for
damage sustained in the event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any checked baggage or
any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took place during the
transportation by air."
47. Id. art. 30 provides that with respect to goods or baggage, a "passenger or consignor shall
have a right of action against the first carrier, and the passenger or consignee who is entitled to delivery
shall have a right of action against the last carrier . ... "
48. Seth v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 329 F.2d 302 (1st Cir,), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 858
(1964).
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B. The Cases
The first American court to consider whether the Warsaw Convention
created a cause of action for wrongful death was the District Court for the
Southern District of New York in Choy v. Pan American Airways, Inc.
49
Choy was an action brought for the death of a passenger killed when
defendant's seaplane crashed into the Pacific Ocean on an international
flight. Plaintiffs were permitted to bring suit on the basis of the Death on
the High Seas Act,50 but the court rejected their allegation of subject
matter jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention, holding that the
Convention created no cause of action for wrongful death. The same result
was reached two years later by the New York Court of Appeals in Wyman
v. Pan American Airways, Inc.
51
In Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana5 2 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, which later decided Benjamins, squarely held that the
Warsaw Convention created no cause of action for the purposes of
domestic law. The court relied on its earlier decision, Komlos v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France,53 in which defendant airline had argued
that the Convention created a cause of action to the exclusion of all others,
thus barring plaintiff's invocation of the New York wrongful death statute.
Although it could have avoided the issue by declaring that any
Conventional cause of action was not exclusive,5 4 the Komlos trial court
held that the Convention created no cause of action. 5 On appeal, the
Second Circuit reversed on other grounds, without discussing whether the
Warsaw Convention created a right to sue. When Noel came up on appeal
four years later, the Second Circuit interpreted this silence as implied
affirmation of the Komlos trial court's resolution of the issue and held,
without further discussion, that the Convention created no new
substantive law. Other courts quickly adopted the Noel ruling.
56
If, in light of this history, the Second Circuit overruled Noel and
Komlos for the reasons stated in Benjamins, it would be very surprising.
The remainder of this Case Comment explores the traditional and
49. [1941] Am. Mar. Cas. 483, 1 Av. Cas. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
50. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1970), which provides in part: "Whenever the death of a person shall
be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from
the shore . .. the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages . . . in
admiralty ... 
51. 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct. 1943), af/'dnren., 267 App. Div.947,48 N.Y.S.2d
459, affid mem., 293 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d 785, 48 N.Y.S.2d 459, cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1945).
52. 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
53. 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953).
54. Calkins, The Cause ofAction Under the Warsaw Convention, Part 11, 26 J. AIR. L. & Co, t.
323, 328 (1959).
55. 111 F. Supp. 393, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953).
56. Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 974 (1977); Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
57. See notes 6-8 and accompanying text supra.
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practical considerations that may have contributed to the Benjamins
decision and the probable effect of the decision on American law.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE Benjamins DECISION
Because the United States has not implemented the Warsaw
Convention by statute and there has generally been no common-law cause
of action for wrongful death,58 Warsaw plaintiffs unable to establish
diversity jurisdiction 9 but wishing to bring suit in federal court have
forced the federal courts to consider whether the Convention itself creates
a cause of action, that is, whether article 17 of the Convention is self-
executing.
A. Is Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention Self-Executing?
The Traditional Analysis
Under the approach traditionally enunciated by the courts, a treaty is
self-executing whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which rights of
the private citizen may be determined. More specifically, a treaty may be
considered self-executing if it was the intent of the parties that no
implementing legislation be required to carry out the purpose of the
agreement, and if its provisions can be given effect without further
legislation.61
1. Did the Signatories of the- Convention
Intend to Create a Cause of Action?
The Benjamins court correctly suggested that the purpose of the
Convention was to establish international uniformity of private air law.62
That much is evident from the official title of the treaty: Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air. Nevertheless it is not as clear as the court assumed that this uniformity
was to be furthered by the creation of a Conventional cause of action for
wrongful death.
There is a finite number of sources upon which writers can draw to
determine the intentions of the Convention's signatories with respect to a
cause of action for wrongful death. Courts and commentators struggling
with this issue have buttressed their diverse points of view by analyzing
various documents. These include the Convention itself,61 Secretary of
58. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 384 (1970).
59. See note 3 supra.
60. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
61. Comment, Criteria for Self-Executing Treaties, U. ILL. L. F. 238, 239-40 (1968).
62. 572 F.2d at 917.
63. Eg., Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977);
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 17, at 517.
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State Hull's letter transmitting the Convention to President Roosevelt,"
the minutes of the Convention,65 earlier drafts of the Convention and the
meetings at which they were presented,66 the French text of the treaty,67
and the effect of the so-called Montreal Agreement.6" Because another
review of these sources would add little to the resolution of the issue of
self-execution, none will be attempted here. In view of the support avail-
able for each position, no argument-including that of the court in Ben-
jamins69-is particularly compelling.
What the Benjamins court found to be "[m]ore compelling" than the
minutes and documents of the meetings or its analysis of the Convention
text was "the evidence of how other signatories [specifically, the United
Kingdom and Canada] interpreted its provisions."'7 The structure of the
opinion71 implies that the conclusion "compelled" by this evidence is that
the Convention itself created a cause of action. In fact, there has been no
treatment of the issue by the Convention's most important signatories
because their courts have alternative means of asserting jurisdiction. The
United Kingdom's Carriage by Air Act of 1932,72 which incorporated the
Warsaw Convention by reference and excluded other bases for
international air carrier liability for wrongful death, eliminated the need to
determine whether the Convention alone created a right to sue in British
courts.73 Similar statutes produced similar results in both Canada74 and
Australia,75 and the possibility of a Conventional cause of action has never
been considered in France, where the contract of carriage can provide a
right to bring suit for any cause, "be it wrongful death, personal injury,
delay, or damage to baggage or cargo. 76
64. !-g., Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d913,920(1978) (VanGraafeiland.J.,
dissenting).
65. Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Convention, Part 1,26J. AIR. L. & COI.
217, 228-34 (1959).
66. Id. at 222-23.
67. Note, Warsaw Convention-Limited Liability- Vo)ge Charter, 34 J. AIR L. & Co,,. 643
(1968).
68. Officially named "Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention
and Hague Protocols." 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
69. Benjamins relies on the minutes and documents of the meetings leading to the Convention's
adoption, and analysis of the text. 572 F.2d at 917-18.
70. 572 F.2d at 918.
71. The preceding quotation is found immediately following a discussion of the text of the
Convention and how it "sheds light" on the intended result. 572 F.2d at 918-19.
72. 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 4.
73. G. MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 228 (1977). Britain's Carriage by
Air Act of 1961,9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 27, repeated the 1932 statute and extended the FatalAccidents Act of
1846,9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (better known as Lord Campbell's Act) to fill the void.The change has been of
little consequence to litigants because there continues to be acause of action forwrongful death arising
in the course of international traveL G. MILLER, supra, at 229.
74. CAN. REv. STAT. c. 14, § 2(5) (1970).
75. 2 AcTs AuSt.. P. 1901-1973, at 643 (1974).
76. G. MILLER, supra note 73, at 231.
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2. Does the Warsaw Convention Contain the Necessary
Elements of a Cause of Action for Wrongful Death?
In holding that the Warsaw Convention creates no cause of action for
wrongful death, the District Court for the Southern District of New York,
in Choy v. Pan American Airways, Inc., stated:
There is no enabling act vesting the ownership of the cause of action stated by
the Warsaw Convention nor even stating who may be thought to be injured
by a death and, though the liability stated in Article 17 is part of the treaty
which was adopted, we do not understand how it can be defined or enforced
without statutory assistance, which it has not as yet received.
77
It is not evident from the opinion whether the Choy court considered
article 24 of the Convention 78 in conjunction with article 17. Together
these articles are interpreted by some commentators to mean that while the
Convention creates a cause of action for wrongful death, the determina-
tion of who may bring suit is to be made with reference to national law.79
Treaties should be construed liberally to accomplish their purposes;
therefore, if the parties to the Convention intended to create a cause of
action for wrongful death, it is altogether proper to take elements of a
cause of action\ from national law.
On the other hand, at the time Choy was decided there was little
national law fronwhich to draw the elements of a wrongful death action.
Several federal statutes0 provided exceptions to the common-law doctrine
that a private cause of action would not lie for wrongful death, but these
statutes were limited intheir scope. Furthermore, although the court could
have taken the missing~elements of a Conventional cause of action from
these statutes, it was abl to provide plaintiffs with a recovery without
overruling ancient common law to create a new cause of action for
wrongful death. 8'
In a 1970 case, Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., the United
States Supreme Court found a common-law cause of action for wrongful
death in admiralty, stating "it is sufficient at this point to conclude . ..
that the work of the legislatures has made allowance of recovery for
wrongful death the general rule of American law, and its denial the excep-
tion. 812 Four years later, the Court reaffirmed its earlier holding and
77. [1941] Am. Mar. Cas. at487-88, I Av. Cas. at 948-49. Although thequestion whethcra treaty
contains the necessary elements of a cause of action is part of the traditional approach to determining
whether it is self-executing, the Benjamins court discussed neither the issue nor Choy's resolution of it,
78. The pertinent part of art. 24 states: "In the cases covered by Article 17 the provisions of the
preceding paragraph shall also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons who
have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights." (emphasis added).
79. Calkins, supra note 65, at 333. Cf Comment, Air Passenger Deaths, 41 CORNELL L. Q, 243,
260 (1956) (interpreting arts. 17 & 24 together as indicating conventional reliance on pre existing rights
to sue).
80. Kg., Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970); Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1970); Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970).
81. See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
82. 398 U.S. 375, 393 (1970).
[Vol. 40:277
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION
began to indicate the parties who have the right to sue on the new cause of
action and the rules for measuring damages.8 3 This willingness to dispense
with the old rule, which was recognized as "not founded in good reason"
and "contrary to natural equity and general principles of law" when origi-
nally adopted by the Supreme Court,8 4 seemingly clears the way for
developing a national law that would support a Conventional cause of
action for wrongful death.
To apply the new-found Conventional cause of action to individual
cases, the courts must determine who has the right to sue for wrongful
death and the measure of damages they might recover. There are several
possible solutions. 85
First, the courts could adopt the admiralty common-law definitions
set out in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet,86 allowing recovery by
dependents of the decedent for loss of support, loss of services, loss of
society, and damages for funeral expenses,87 with the adjustments
necessary to prevent double recovery when the decedent has previously
recovered for his personal injury.88 This approach would solve the problem
of defining the measure of damages, but it fails to provide a definition of
"dependents" and thus a determination of who may bring suit.
Second, the courts could look to several federal statutes for the
necessary elements. The Death on the High Seas Act8 9 provides an
admiralty cause of action for wrongful death of any person beyond a
marine league (three miles) from shore. The right to sue is vested in "the
decedent's wife, husband, parent, child or dependent relative,"90 and the
measure of damage is "pecuniary loss.' '91
The Federal Employers' Liability Act?2 and the Jones Act?3 create
causes of action for the deaths of railroad employees and seamen,
respectively, killed in the course of their employment. The right to sue vests
first in decedent's surviving children and spouse, if any, then in decedent's
parents or next of kin.
It is also possible for the courts to avoid answering these questions
83. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
84. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 213 (1886).
85. It is not the purpose of this section to argue the benefits and drawbacks of any of these
solutions, but rather to show that there is national law on which the courts could draw to fill the holes
left in the Conventional cause of action by the terms of the treaty.
86.. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
87. Id. at 584.
88. Id. at 592. The danger of double recovery arises when the decedent has previously recovered
for loss of future earnings and the plantiffs are seeking to recover for loss of support.
89. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1970).
90. Id. § 761.
91. Id. § 762. Byjudicial gloss, "pecuniary loss" has developed to include loss of support and loss
of services, Douglas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386 (3d Cir. 1971), but not loss of society.
Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1934). Compensability of funeral expenses is a
matter of debate. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 591 (1974).
92. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
93. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
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altogether. Under this approach, the Conventional cause of action would
be used solely for the purpose of establishing the subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts, which would also take jurisdiction over
pendent state claims for wrongful death. The court would then decide the
case on the basis of the state claim without reaching the Conventional
cause of action. Leaving aside the problems of establishing the presence of
a substantial federal question,94 this solution is not very satisfactory
because it leaves major conflict of laws problems that must be resolved by
the courts.95 Furthermore, it does not create the uniformity of damage
awards considered so desirable by a number of commentators; 96 the
personal representatives of two hypothetical passengers sitting side by side
when the airplane crashed might receive different recoveries solely because
they are residents of different states. On the other hand, another sort of
uniformity would be achieved: the recoveries generated by the deaths of
individuals identical in every way, except that one died in a car accident
and the other in an air crash, would also be identical.
The first of the solutions mentioned above, analogy to the common
law of admiralty created in Moragne and Gaudet, is the approach most
likely to win approval of the courts. In Gaudet, the Supreme Court
expressly refused to draw analogies to federal wrongful death statutes,
preferring to adopt the more progressive decisions of state courts that had
allowed damages not considered to be "pecuniary loss. 97 The determina-
tion of who may bring suit and their rights inter se would be no more
difficult in the context of the Warsaw Convention than it will be under
Moragne.
Another question that has been raised by courts and commentators is
whether the Conventional cause of action would sound in tort or
contract.98 Very few modern commentators have been interested in
categorizing the various causes of action as "tort" or "contract," 99 and for
good reason. Once the right is created and vested in particular persons, and
the measure of damages defined, the particular form of action into which it
would have fit is irrelevant. 100
94. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974).
95. See notes 119-21 and accompanying text infra.
96. See, e.g., Fridman, The Interaction of Tort and Contract, 93 L. Q. REv. 422 (1973), Tydings,
Air Crash Litigation: A Judicial Problem and a Congressional Solution, 18 Am, U.L. REV. 299
(1967); Note, Aircraft Disaster Litigation, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 231 (1976).
97. 414 U.S. at 588.
98. See, e.g., Salamon v. K.L.M., 107 N.YS.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'dmem., 281 App. Div.
987, 120 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1953); Calkins, supra note 65, at 228.
99. But see Prosser, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED Topics ON Tl18 LAW OF
TORTS 380-452 (1953).
100. Regardless how the Conventional cause of action is characterized, "[t]he right to damages
shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within 2 years, rcconed from the date of arrival at the
destination, or from the date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on which the
transportation stopped." Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 29(1).
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B. Is Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention Self-Executing?
Some Practical Considerations
A comparison of the cases deciding whether particular treaties are
self-executing with the texts and minutes of the treaties themselves reveals
that the courts have considered more than the traditional questions
regarding the intent of the parties and the elements of a cause of aetion.t01
It would seem that the courts are especially free to consider the practical
consequences of their decisions when, as with the Warsaw Convention, the
traditional analysis is inconclusive.
Three groups stand to be affected by the Benjamins holding that the
Warsaw Convention creates a cause of action for wrongful death: the
courts, the attorneys, and the parties. Each is discussed below.
1. The Effect of Benjamins on the Courts
Benjamins v. British European Airways may have been decided with
an eye toward judicial economy. °2 A Conventional cause of action for
wrongful death would allow the consolidation of all suits properly brought
in American courts by Warsaw plaintiffs on the basis of the same
international air disaster and might reduce the complexity of air crash
litigation.
If a Warsaw plaintiff brings suit in federal court, his wrongful death
action may be consolidated with other suits arising from the same disaster
for the purpose of pretrial proceedings10 3 and for the trial itself.104 Federal
subject matter jurisdiction may be established on a number of grounds
other than a Conventional cause of action.
First, diversity jurisdiction' is'available if the citizenship of the
plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship or principal place of business of the
defendants,0 6 who will often include the manufacturer of the airplane that
crashed, the manufacturer of the component of the airplane that allegedly
failed and caused the crash, the employees of the air carrier, and the air
carrier itself.10
7
101. See Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that U.N. Sec. Council
Resolution 301(f), calling upon all states "to abstain from entering into economic and other forms of
relationship or dealings with South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia which may entrench its
authority over the territory.. . "was not self-executing); see also, e.g., Ortman v. Stanray Corp.,
371 F.2d 154, 157 (7th Cir. 1967) (holding that the International Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, art. 2(l), which states that "[n]ationals of each ofthecountries
of the Union shall, in all other countries of the Union . . . enjoy the advantages that their respective
laws now grant to their own nationals, without any prejudice to the rights specifically provided by the
present convention" was not self-executing).
102. 572 F.2d at 919.
103. See note 7 supra.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976).
105. See note 3 supra.
106. The plaintiffs citizenship must be diverse from the citizenship of every defendant.
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
107. Hearings, supra note 44, at 105 (statement of John Martin).
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Second, the federal courts have original jurisdiction over all claims
against the United States Government,'0 8 including those invoking the
Federal Tort Claims Act.'0 9 Thus, plaintiffs may enter federal court by
asserting the United States was at fault for its wrongful or nonexistent
approval, certification, or inspection of the ill-fated airplane,' 10 or for the
wrongful acts of American air traffic controllers.'
Third, the federal courts may have original jurisdiction under the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958.' 12 This statute has been held to create some
private causes of action," 3 but it is unclear whether Warsaw cases are
within its scope.
Fourth, if the accident giving rise to the suit was a crash into navigable
waters within three miles of shore, the federal common-law cause of action
for wrongful death, created by Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,'14
would provide federal admiralty jurisdiction. Fifth, if the accident
occurred on or over the high seas, the Death on the High Seas Act"5 would
provide a remedy in admiralty court.
In spite of the foregoing, there is a group of plaintiffs who cannot
bring suit in federal court in the absence of a Conventional cause of action,
and would therefore be forced to bring suit separately. Benjamins provides
a perfect example of this type of plaintiff: Benjamin, brought suit against
nondiverse defendants for the wrongful death of a passenger killed while
riding in a plane over foreign territory on a ticket that does not even
mention the United States, the plane having been manufactured and
owned by foreign corporations. While obviously the number of such
plaintiffs is exceedingly small, one plaintiff forced to bring suit separately
from a consolidated action of five hundred will double the number of trials
arising from the same accident.
This aspect of the Conventional cause of action could take on greater
significance if the present trend toward limiting federal diversity
jurisdiction continues." 6 This new-found cause of action will allow
consolidation in the federal courts of large and increasing numbers of suits
that might not otherwise have been within their jurisdiction.
A more immediate consideration is the possibility of reducing the
complexity of litigation arising from international air crash disasters by
way of the Conventional cause of action. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3,
19741 '7 illustrates how staggeringly complex this litigation can be. The case
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976).
109. Id. §§ 2671-2680.
110. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 737 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
111. Hearings, supra note 44, at 105 (statement of John Martin).
112. 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1970).
113. Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
114. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
115. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1970).
116. See I MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.71 [3.-2], at 701.29-.30 (2d ed. 1978).
117. 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
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arose from the crash of a DC-10 airliner manufactured by McDonnell
Douglas Corporation and operated by Turkish Air Lines. Some 1000
dependants of 337 decedents from twenty-four countries and at least
twelve states brought 203 suits in federal district court; of these, 191 suits
were originally filed in the Central District of California, and ten were
transferred to that court by the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation.
Each of these suits included cross-claims, counterclaims and third party
claims; "[a]ll the cross-claims [had] numerous special defenses, one as
many as 20."' 1
The conflict of laws problem alone should have been enough to make
Judge Hall wish he had been on the ill-fated airplane along with plaintiffs'
decedents. Turkish Air Lines was sued for wrongful death; McDonnell
Douglas and General Dynamics were sued on the theories of strict
products liability, contribution, and indemnity; the United States
Government was sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act." 9 Each of these
theories and causes of action serves a different policy; thus, the issue of
whatjurisdiction's law should be applied had to be resolved separately for
each of them.
And the case could have been even more complex. Before the court
ruled on a variety of thorny issues that had been raised, 120 defendants
McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, and Turkish Air Lines agreed
among themselves to a formula for "sharing all the damages so that the
matter of liability need not be litigated, but that all claims would be
disposed of by settlement, or trial on the issue of damages. 12
A Conventional cause of action will simplify international air crash
litigation to the extent it eliminates conflicts over what laws give plaintiffs
the right to sue the airline and the rules for determining the measure of
damages; the step is nevertheless a small one. The Warsaw Convention
does not affect causes of action against, or the liability of, aircraft
manufacturers or the United States Government. 22 Nor does the
Convention affect the issues of contribution and indemnity between the
airline and manufacturers. Furthermore, unless the Conventional cause of
action is held to preempt other grounds for any suit within its scope, the
courts will still be forced to deal with conflict of laws questions merely to
resolve a wrongful death suit against an airline. Thus, any argument that a
Conventional cause of action will greatly reduce the complexity of
litigation of suits arising from international air crash disasters is
misguided.
118. Id. at 736.
119. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976).
120. Issues unresolved by the court included applicability of the California Consumer Credit
Act, a motion for summaryjudgment against plaintiff's claims for punitive damages, and thechoice of
law on liability. 399 F. Supp. at 733, 737.
121. Id. at 737.
122. Hearings, supra note 44, at 105 (Statement of John Martin).
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2. The Effect of Benjamins on Plaintiffs' Attorneys
Warsaw litigation is a complicated process that relatively few law
firms appear willing to attempt. 123 Although damages must be proved for
each plaintiff individually, a firm may spend significantly less time earning
its contingent fee if it can consolidate the trials of issues common to all of
its plaintiffs. The firm may profit further by consolidating all of its suits
with those being guided through the federal courts by other firms, and by
whatever reduction in complexity Benjamins provides.
3. The Effect of Benjamins on the Parties to the Litigation
The effect of Benjamins v. British European Airways on the vast
majority of plaintiffs seems likely to be slight. Beniamins himself could
have brought suit in England12 4 or in the state courts of California. 125 Even
before the Second Circuit's decision, there was little chance that an
individual who had suffered a loss at the hands of an air carrier would have
been without a forum in which to seek recovery. It is commonplace that
wrongful death recoveries are generally higher in the United States than in
any other part of the world and it is true that the Conventional cause of
action may provide damages not compensable in suits brought on other
grounds; 26 Warsaw recoveries nevertheless remain limited to $75,000.
There is no evidence that Warsaw plaintiffs' legal fees will decrease despite
the reduced complexity of the Conventional cause of action and the
increased efficiency of consolidating suits in federal court when the
Convention is the plaintiff's sole claim to federal subject matter
jurisdiction. At most, the Convention puts another arrow in the plaintiff's
quiver. Defendants will be benefited only to the extent Benjamins is their
sole basis for removing actions to federal court or consolidating them
there.
IV. THE REVISED WARSAW CONVENTION
The Warsaw Convention "is not a treaty that has mouldered on the
books."'127 The United States Senate is currently considering three
protocols to the Warsaw Convention 128 that, if ratified, will completely
replace the older treaty and substantially alter the terms considered by the
123. See, e.g., In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (1975), in which
three law firms represented the bulk of the plaintiffs.
124. Carriage by Air Act of 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 27.
125. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) and accompanying comments of the
Judicial Council, id. at 480, which allow California courts to exercise jurisdiction over corporations
"doing business" in the state. Selling airline tickets is clearly "doing business." Buckeye Boiler Co, v.
Superior Ct., 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
126. This, of course, depends on what injuries the courts deem compensable. See notes 85-97 and
accompanying text supra.
127. Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 920 (1978) (Van Granfeiland, J.,
dissenting) (citing Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1093 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977)),
128. The official titles are: Guatemala City Protocol to Amend the Convention for the
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Benjamins court. The Senate hearings 2 9 have dealt almost exclusively
with the higher air carrier liability limits set by the Revised Warsaw
Convention, 30 and it is apparent that the liability issue will make or break
the revision.
More important to this Case Comment, however, is that the Revised
Convention holds the air carrier strictly liable for the death or personal
injury of its passengers,' 3' and makes the liability limitations "un-
breakable" in the sense that the carrier would be within their protection
even when a plaintiff could show willful misconduct or inadequate delivery
of the required warnings. 32 If the Revised Warsaw Convention is ratified
by the Senate, the United States will denounce the original Warsaw
Convention in order to leave the country "bound by only the most modem
set of rules."' 33 Theoretically, this would amount to a repeal of the law on
which the Benjamins decision is founded. As a practical matter, the
Revised Convention provides a stronger basis for finding a cause of action
for wrongful death, 34 although giving no better guidance by way of
legislative history or its terms than did its predecessor.
Complexity tends to enter air disaster litigation as plaintiffs are
required to join as defendants the manufacturers of the airplane and its
component parts and the United States Government 135 in order to
circumvent liability limitations on the way to full recovery of damages
proven. Under the Revised Warsaw Convention, a majority of plaintiffs 36
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on
September 28, 1929, as amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on September 28, 1955;
Additional ProtocolNo. 3 to Amend, etc.; and Additional ProtocolNo.4 to Amend, etc. [hereinafter
collectively cited as Revised Warsaw Convention].
129. Hearings, supra note 44.
130. If the Revised Warsaw Convention is ratified by the Senate, the new air carrier liability
limitations will be 100,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). The value of the SDR is determined by
a weighted average of sixteen currencies, with the weights attributed to each currency broadly
proportioned to each country's share of the world's exports. The U.S. dollar accounts for one-third of
the SDR's value. K. RosENtN, supra note 14. In addition, the 100,000-SDR limitation may in individual
countries be effectively increased by S200,000 under Supplemental Compensation Plans, which
amount to mandatory insurance programs to be funded by surcharges on the sale prices of
international tickets.
131. Article 17(1) of the Revised Warsaw Convention provides:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or personal injury of a passenger
upon condition only that the event which caused the death or injury took place on board the
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking ordisembarking. However, the
carrier is not liable if the death or injury resulted solely from the state of health of the
passenger.
Article 21 provides the airline with a second defense: recovery is reduced ifdecedent's death was due at
least in part to his own wrongful acts or omissions.
132. The Revised Convention thus represents a significant departure from the present
Convention. See notes 14-16 and accompanying text infra.
133. Hearings, supra note 44, at 7 (statement of Herbert J. Hansel).
134. Moore & Palaez, Admiralty Jurisdiction-The Sky's the Limit, 33 J. AiR L. &CoMt. 3,31
(1967).
135. See notes 120-21 and accompanying text supra.
136. The exact percentage is in dispute. A Civil Aeronautics Board study indicating that80%of
all plaintiffs would receive full recoveries under the Revised Convention has come under severe attack.
See Hearings, supra note 44, at 63-88 (statement of Elias Saad and John Benn).
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will be unable to prove damages in excess of the liability limitations.
Consolidation would take on increasing importance as the liability
limitations become inadequate due to inflation' 37 and plaintiffs would be
forced to bring other parties, who would remain unaffected by the liability
limitations, into the suit in order to recover all of their provable damages.
V. CONCLUSION
The Benjamins court could have strengthened its arguments
considerably by focusing on the recent shift in judicial attitude toward
wrongful death. Moragne and Gaudet could supply the necessary elements
of a cause of action, lacking when Choy, Komlos, and Noel were decided.
The change in attitude is certainly significant enough to justify a change in
treatment of the Warsaw Convention.
As a practical matter, Benjamins is a step toward easing the burden of
Warsaw litigation on the courts. Although it will neither cause the
consolidation of all the suits arising from any single air disaster" nor
significantly reduce the complexity of the litigation, the benefits far
outweigh the costs to the litigants.'3 9 The importance of a Conventional
cause of action would in the short run be significantly diminished by
Senate ratification of the Revised Warsaw Convention, but would tend to
increase as Warsaw litigation once again became more complex.
David A. Wormser
137. Id.
138. Unless the Conventional cause of action is found to be exclusive, plaintiff may avoid
removal from state to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976) by alleging only the state wrongful
death statute as ground for relief. In any event, plaintiffs will still be free to sue in any other country
with jurisdiction, and certain passengers on the ill-futed plane will not come within the Warsaw
Convention's scope.
139. State court judges obviously have substantial experience in wrongful death cases and arc
quite capable of handling Warsaw cases. See In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732
(C.D. Cal. 1974), in which Judge Hall appointed several retired state court judges to make findings
regarding plaintiff's damages.
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